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The Caring State? On Rural Welfare Governance in Post-reform
Vietnam and China
Minh T. N. Nguyen and Meixuan Chen
Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany
ABSTRACT
We make three arguments in this review of the literature on rural
welfare governance in Vietnam and China. First, welfare
restructuring in these countries has gone through two
overlapping processes of contraction and expansion, underlined
by changing politics of needs and shifting modes of governance
since their shift from state to market socialism. Such politics are
the outcome of the Communist party-state’s dual project of
legitimation and control, as widespread social conflicts challenge
its legitimacy. Secondly, the dislocations and inequalities induced
by marketization have been coupled with greater involvement of
a broad range of social actors in welfare provision. Thirdly, the rise
of social protection is shaped by state control, wealth disparities
between regions and social classes, and a care politics deeming
certain groups as failing to meet the human capital requirements
of the new economy. While providing some buffer against
destitution, existing forms of social protection do little to alleviate








China and Vietnam are two of the few remaining socialist countries that have long aban-
doned central planning for a market economy. In a system now commonly called market
socialism, the Communist party-state remains in power as the economy is liberalized. More
than three decades have passed since China started reforms in 1979, which Vietnam also
officially adopted in 1986. Much has changed in the two countries, now richer, vastly more
urbanized and globally connected. While poverty reduction and economic growth have
been impressive, they have gone hand in hand with rising social inequalities. Reviewing
the literature on rural welfare governance in Vietnam and China, we suggest that signifi-
cant changes in welfare creation and distribution have been occurring, changes that are
internal to shifting modes of governance in these countries.
Drawing on recent theorizing of the relationship between socialist governance and pri-
vatization (Zhang and Ong 2008; Schwenkel and Leshkowich 2012), we make three argu-
ments. First, contra the common narrative of world-wide austerity going stronger, welfare
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Meixuan Chen meixuan.chen@bristol.ac.uk, mxmei.chen@gmail.com Max Planck Institute for Social
Anthropology, Halle, Germany
ETHICS AND SOCIAL WELFARE, 2017
VOL. 11, NO. 3, 230–247
https://doi.org/10.1080/17496535.2017.1300307
restructuring in Vietnam and China has gone through two overlapping processes of con-
traction and expansion, underlined by changing politics of needs and shifting modes of
governance. Such politics are shaped by the party-state’s dual projects of legitimation
and control, as widespread social conflicts and tension challenge its legitimacy, especially
in rural areas. Secondly, the dislocations and inequalities arising from marketization have
been met by a countermovement of social protection from a broad range of social actors,
as Polanyi formulated in his important thesis on the double movements arising from run-
away liberalization (1985). Third, the rise of social protection in these settings, however, is
located at the intersection between state control, wealth disparities between regions and
social classes, and a care politics that Others certain social groups, in many ways consoli-
dating the power of the party-state, which is recasting itself as a caring and modern
welfare state. Yet, while providing some buffer against destitution, existing forms of
social protection do little to alleviate the social exclusion and inequality resulting from
post-reform dispossession.
Vietnam and China differ greatly in their size and population, historical experiences of
colonialism and socialism, and the depth and outcomes of their economic reforms. While
both embraced state socialism around the early 1950s, Vietnam went through more than
two decades of war. Meanwhile, the massive social engineering that caused significant
turmoil in China, such as the Great Leap Forward, hardly happened in Vietnam. The
state’s intervention in social reproduction was stronger in China, notably through stricter
enforcement of policies on marriage and child-bearing and the distribution of workers/
peasants’ entitlement. The one-child policy was implemented in China with greater coer-
cion, whereas the Vietnamese state largely carried out a two-child policy through social
pressures and discriminatory entitlements (Croll, Davin, and Kane 1985; Gammeltoft
1999). Industrialization and urbanization have taken place at a deeper level in China
through its dual-track model that promotes special economic zones in coastal cities along-
side rural industrialization under the Township and Village Enterprises program. Vietnam
has mainly concentrated development in and around the major urban centers, although it
is also urbanizing rapidly. The concentration of wealth and income inequality is noticeably
higher in China than in Vietnam (Malesky and London 2014).
Keeping in mind these divergences, we do not systematically compare rural welfare
governance between Vietnam and China. Our purpose is to identify parallel dynamics in
two countries that embrace market socialism, a system in which the political monopoly
of the party-state continues to shape the direction of marketization.
Post-reform development, governing from a distance and new
prudentialism
Despite the state’s continued dominance in certain sectors, privatization, commodification
and globalization have been the mainstays of post-reform development, prompting
massive industrialization, urbanization and population mobility. There are hundreds of
millions of rural migrants in China and millions in Vietnam. Unprecedented urbanization
has been occurring along the east coast of China and the Southwest of Vietnam,
leading to the emergence of mega urban centers. Becoming rich, consuming and
owning property, previously politically incorrect and socially condemned, have become
normalized aspirations.
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Major political transformations have also taken place. As Zhang (2010, 10) points out,
two concurrent political processes of dispossession and devaluation have been integral
to post-reform development. Dispossession has taken place in the form of the political
elite appropriating public assets and natural resources, of millions of workers losing
their job security, of millions of others undergoing forced relocations, losing their property
and livelihoods for urban development. Devaluation underscores the construction of
differential social and spatial categories of labor and citizenship by the state. In both
countries, there is an all-encompassing discourse of ‘human quality’ (suzhi/dan tri) that
differentiates desirable from undesirable subjects and regions (Anagnost 2004; Kipnis
2007; Nguyen and Locke 2014). In this construction, the urban poor, rural people, rural
migrants and remote regions are in want of human quality and in need of education
and guidance by state and market agents. Such a construction serves to frame the respon-
sibility of well-being, employment and care as a matter of individual effort and ability
(Gaetano and Jacka 2004; Fong and Murphy 2006). It helps justify the social consequences
of development policies and sustain state legitimacy in the face of rising inequalities,
environmental pollution and unemployment. While life under state socialism, character-
ized by state intrusion in private life, coercive mobilization for grand projects, poverty
and war in Vietnam’s case, was never secure, post-reform insecurity has been drastically
reconstituted through such dispossession and devaluation.
The party-state continues to claim its role as the sole guardian of the nation’s interests
and the well-being of the people. Socialist instruments of control such as the household
registration system (hukou/ho khau) continue to be used for regulating population mobi-
lity and welfare distribution. Nevertheless, state intervention in social and private life has
become more subtle than in the previous era. Scholars have spoken about the ways in
which socialist control mechanism intermingles with neoliberal practices of governing
from a distance in the governing approach of the party-state. In Vietnam, ‘state and
non-state actors have over the past decade become increasingly interested in the projects
of self-cultivation and value creation that resonate both with the needs and anxieties of
the market place and with continuous socialist genealogies’ (Schwenkel and Leshkowich
2012, 386). The Chinese state similarly ‘creates a space for people to exercise a multitude of
private choices, but always within the political limits set by the state’, an approach that
Zhang and Ong refer to as ‘socialism from afar’ (2008, 2).
The shifting welfare dynamics in Vietnam and China are part of these governing
dynamics. While the party-state has been extending minimal welfare to rural populations,
this move foregrounds what some refer to as ‘new prudentialism’, the notion of an apoli-
tical moral subject primarily concerned with private choice and private responsibility (Rose
1999, 158). In such logics, welfare constitutes an individualized mandate according to
which individuals and families should use their own resources to ensure well-being.
While contradicting the state socialist principle of universalism, ‘new prudentialism’ res-
onates with cultural ideas of the family and community as the primary sites of care for
which moral obligations of filial piety and reciprocity are central. What is novel in these
contexts is the promotion of an industry seeking to market solutions to anxieties about
future risks and moral obligations as well as the making of self-responsible subjects
seeking to preempt risks via the market. The coexistence of the various moral frameworks
helps to produce self-reliant citizens pursuing their private goals while remaining politi-
cally governable by the state.
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At the same time, the post-reform dislocations experienced by the dispossessed and
the marginalized not only pose challenges to the legitimacy of the state, demanding it
to live up to ideological claims, but also invoke diverse social responses. What has been
happening in China and Vietnam draws parallels to Polanyi’s vision of a double movement
underlining the unfolding of an unfettered market economy (1985). On the one hand,
Polanyi argues, economic liberalization unleashes destructive forces through the commo-
dification of land, labor and money, the fabric of social life; on the other hand, society
would respond through a countermovement of social protection. In China and Vietnam,
the social problems emerging from post-reform liberalization have been met by a rise
of social protection partaken by public and market institutions, social movements and
actors, creating an entirely new welfare landscape. The social protection is, however,
located in a field of power dominated by the party-state, yet with intense struggles
between the governing and the governed and fuzzy boundaries between the state, the
market and the so-called third sector.
Changing welfare landscape: dispossession and ‘socialization’
During state socialism, welfare was often of low standards, uneven and characterized by a
vast difference between the city and the country. There was an overreliance on the urban
work unit and the rural agricultural cooperatives in financing welfare (Bryant 1998; Solin-
ger 2005). These institutions distributed their meager resources according to egalitarian
principles (Gao 1999). The state promised care of children and the elderly to support
the productive workforce; childcare groups were organized and the elderly were given
grain subsidies, although in rural areas, care continued to be largely secured through
the family by women’s unpaid labor.
Nevertheless, there was visible improvement in primary health care and education
through public measures such as immunization and a basic schooling system – mortality,
public health problems and illiteracy all declined in rural areas (Bryant 1998; Gao 1999;
Zhang, Yi, and Rozelle 2010; London 2011). Basic healthcare was provided through state
funding of commune health centers in Vietnam while in rural China, there was a system
of barefoot doctors, local people trained in basic medical skills providing treatment for
farmers. In China, primary and secondary education was made accessible to the rural
population through barefoot teachers and urban teachers sent to rural areas, while a
quota system allowed rural students to enter tertiary education (Gao 1999). In Vietnam,
most rural villages had access to a primary school by the 1960s and literacy significantly
improved in later decades (Bryant 1998).
Following their reforms, the rural cooperatives and the urban work units were dis-
mantled, along with the health, education and care they had financed – these services
quickly became expensive market commodities. In China, barefoot doctors were aban-
doned in 1981, and the public health system was in near collapse; enrolment into
primary and secondary schools dropped by 14 million students and more than 40 thou-
sand schools were closed nationwide (Gao 1999; Zhang, Yi et al. 2010). In Vietnam, a
similar situation was observed following the reform (Bryant 1998; Truong 2007; London
2011). Meanwhile, not only were rural people stripped off the care and services previously
available, heavy agricultural taxes were levied to raise funds for local development pro-
jects. Land, the main source of rural security, was taken away for local development,
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especially in the periphery of bigger cities. In China, about 50–66million peasants lost all or
part of their farmland and homes to local development projects between 1990 and 2002
(Hsing 2010, 32). In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of households have been in the same
situation (Nguyễn 2009; Phuc, van Westen, and Zoomers 2014).
In the meantime, rural areas came to bear the costs of reproducing a migrant labor
force for urban and industrial development. The low cost of this labor force is secured
through the devaluation of migrant labor and migrants’ limited access to urban welfare
and social rights on account of the household registration system (Wang 2005; Fong
and Murphy 2006; Le, Tran, and Thao Nguyen 2011). In other words, insecure industrial
and urban employment and a discriminatory citizenship help divert welfare liabilities
towards rural areas. The countryside not only supplies migrant labor but assumes the
reproduction of such labor, notably through the care of the migrants’ rurally based
family members (Nielsen and Smyth 2008; Le, Tran, and Thao Nguyen 2011). Concurrently,
household spending in schooling and medical expenses escalated, becoming burdens for
many − health care has become one of the greatest sources of insecurity for rural house-
holds (Belanger and Liu 2008; Liu and Darimont 2013). Besides, rural migrants often have
to return to the countryside to secure educational and health services because of their
restricted access to urban services (Murphy 2014; Nguyen 2015a). Thus while migration
has become an important means to ensure rural households’ well-being, it also induces
further insecurity and risks (Murphy 2002; Nguyen 2015a). If the market economy has
enabled massive wealth accumulation for certain groups, most rural people have been dis-
proportionately affected by such processes of dispossession and devaluation for the sake
of market development.
In both countries, social unrest due to forced relocation, loss of property, livelihoods and
rights as a result of development and policies such as taxation and family planning has
become the norm. Tax resistance in the 1990s became frequent in rural areas (O’Brien
and Li 2006; Perry and Selden 2010; Wells-Dang 2010). In China, protests related to the coer-
cive enforcement of the one-child policy were also widespread (Perry 2010). Between 1995
and 2005, the recorded number of protests in China went up 10-fold from 8,700 to 87,000
(Fewsmith 2010), and in Vietnam they have become increasingly frequent (Phuc, van
Westen, and Zoomers 2014). Such discontent challenges the party-state’s claim to be the
caring guardian of the people and its promises of social equality. After heady years of econ-
omic growth at all costs, the party-state could no longer ignore the social and political pro-
blems of marketization. These foreground the rhetoric of Harmonious Society in China and
of Social Stability and Development in Vietnam, through which the party-state re-empha-
sizes its role as the moral leader of the nation.
Rather than mere rhetoric, however, the party-state has also been experimenting with
concrete programs. Within more or less a decade, both countries have established a basic
health insurance system and a basic pension program. Cash transfer, food and housing
support, and a range of social protection programs are put in place (see further below).
Yet, the state no longer sees itself as the provider, but as supervisor and legislator of
welfare, as stated by former Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao (2003–13), who promoted
the idea of the Harmonious Society:
Social programs designed to meet non-basic needs should be handed over to the non-public
sector to let the market satisfy the multi-layered and individualized needs of society through
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the development of related industries, and the government should only carry out its supervi-
sory and regulatory responsibilities. (Stepan and Müller 2012, 69)
The term ‘socialization’, frequently used by state actors in both contexts, implies that
people should rely on their own resources for their well-being while actively contributing
to social causes. People must strive to fulﬁll their own needs, except for the neediest and
most incapacitated, deemed to be failing subjects. In many cases, what ‘socialization’ boils
down to is the capacity and readiness to pay:
Our calculations show that we should not expect too much of social welfare. The financial
capacity of the government is only sufficient to maintain a basic system with a low level of
coverage for many components. For a long time to come, free welfare programs (excluding
compulsory education)1 will need to focus on low-income populations and special groups.
Most middle and above-middle-income people in urban and rural areas will have to pay for
their social security programs. Paid-for welfare services are therefore going to continue to
be primary in our social welfare system. (Foundation 2012, 22)
The focus on the individual in the document above disguises a discourse of familialism
that is prevalent in policy statements and media reporting. In both countries, the family
has always been considered as the building block of welfare (Wong 1998; Solinger
2005; Barbieri and Bélanger 2009). During state socialism, it was supposedly superseded
by the socialist state as the ‘bigger family’, which directly intervened in the private life
and decisions of family members (Wong 1998). In practice, because of the low quality
of socialist welfare, familial care remained central to rural people (Barbieri and Belanger
2009; Santos and Harrell 2017). The focus on the family became stronger with the dissol-
ution of cooperatives; family values such as ﬁlial piety and age honoring are now actively
invoked for the care of its members. Family ties are used as criteria for means-tested social
beneﬁts for which only incapacitated people with no supporting family members are eli-
gible (Wong 1998; Nguyen 2015a). Dependency on the state therefore causes the double
stigmatization of incapacity and moral failings.
Yet, alongside population aging andmobility, ideas of personal freedom (Yan 2009) and
what Davis and Friedman (2014) term the deinstitutionalization of marriage are reconsti-
tuting family relations. According to Santos and Harrell (2017), filial obligations are no
longer to be taken for granted – although they remain important, respect and care
within the family are to be earned through mutual personal and affective investment.
Meanwhile, there is indication of ‘a crisis of filial piety’ (Zhang 2017), more generally a
care dilemma in both countries, a situation in which middle-aged adults, particularly
women, are burdened both by familial obligations and the pressure to perform economi-
cally. These have given rise to solutions through the market, be it paid domestic service,
private care homes or life insurance (Chan 2011; Hoang 2015; Nguyen 2015b; Zhang 2017).
While such solutions remain more available to the urban middle class, they are becoming
relevant for better-off rural families, especially in wealthier regions. Familial care thus has
become both highly differentiated and uncertain in both settings – reports of elderly
people being abandoned or small children left behind by migrant parents abound. The
resulting perception of a moral crisis gives an opportunity for the party-state to exert
moral authority, often through guidance on how to act morally in modern times, guidance
that market actors gleefully adopt to promote their services (Santos and Harrell 2017). The
New 24 Exemplars of Filial Piety2 recently released by China’s National Bureau of Senior
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Affairs, for example, includes advices to teach parents how to use the Internet, watch
movies with them, regularly take them to physical check-ups, travel with them, or buy
appropriate insurance for them.
Central to the socialization discourse then is a moral message to citizens, who are
supposed to be privately responsible for the well-being of their family members. It is
also a moral message to other social actors, who should take part in welfare pro-
vision, for example, picking up from where families fail. In both countries, there
emerges a changing mix of welfare actors with varying agendas, including civil
society, religious and community organizations, and private companies (Carrillo and
Duckett 2011; Besharov and Baehler 2013; London 2013). Nevertheless, such diversi-
fication of welfare provision can neither be interpreted as an effect of state policies,
or the altruism and social awareness of these actors alone. As we shall see, as market
logics are permeating state provision of health and education, non-state actors are
increasingly sponsored or co-financed by the state (Wells-Dang 2012; Hildebrandt
2013). One could speak about a movement of social protection underlining this chan-
ging landscape, a countermovement to the dispossessions of the reform. But unlike
Polanyi’s characterization of social protection as irreconcilable with marketization
(1985), the boundaries between the two are blurry, especially because of the
strong presence of the party-state in both domains. In the next section, we review
the actual dynamics of welfare in rural areas, revealing their underlying politics
and forms of exclusion.
Shifting politics of care: needs, exclusions and dependency
On the surface, the current welfare systems of China and Vietnam display elements of both
Bismarkian welfare (emphasis on work-based contributions) and liberal regimes (minimal
protection for residual categories) (Goodman, White, and Kwon 1998; Walker and Wong
2005). Closer examination suggests that the financing and implementation of these pro-
visions are determined by local and regional politics of needs shaped by the dispossession
and devaluation discussed above. This section first examines available and emerging
forms of welfare in detail, then moves on to discuss the politics underlining their formation
or resulting from their application.
Contributory welfare: rural health insurance and pension
In the 1980–90s, half-hearted experiments with rural health insurance took place in
response to rural discontent with the deterioration of health services (Ensor 1995; Ensor
and San 1996; Zhang, Yi, and Rozelle 2010). Not until the mid-2000s did both governments
start to increase health insurance coverage in rural areas (Ekman et al. 2008; Zhang, Yi, and
Rozelle 2010). The move was part of a program to build a ‘new socialist countryside’, which
aims to improve rural infrastructure, social services, and rural human quality (Ekman et al.
2008; Klotzbücher, Peter Lässig, and Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2010). By 2009, official statistics
suggest that 94 percent of the Chinese rural population are covered under the New Coop-
erative Medical Scheme (Liu and Darimont 2013, 102), a revival of the pre-reform Coopera-
tive Medical Scheme. With a law on health insurance passed in 2009, Vietnam does not
have a separate scheme for rural areas, but a unified system with stratified levels of
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payment and multiple components (compulsory, targeted and voluntary) that by now has
covered more than two-thirds of its population.3
The Chinese New Cooperative Medical Care is co-financed by governments at central
and local levels and out-of-pocket payment; public funds are only released on condition
that the participants have bought their insurance. For each participant’s annual
payment of 25–30 yuan, the county supplements 10 yuan, and the central government
provides 20 yuan; the public share amounts to more than 60 percent of the total costs
(Klotzbücher, Peter Lässig, and Weigelin-Schwiedrzik 2010; Zhang, Yi, and Rozelle 2010).
Reimbursement ranges between 30 and 50 percent of the treatment costs, covering
only the expenses of hospitalization and people are required to pay in advance of applying
for reimbursement. In the Vietnamese system, compulsory health insurance payment is
capped at six percent of the employed person’s salary, for which either the state covers
(for state employees), or the employees and employers pay according to a ratio of 2:1.
For the self-employed and peasants, the health insurance is voluntary. The yearly
payment, pegged to the minimum wage, is currently 25 USD (500,000 VND). Most of
the rural populations are required to pay for themselves, while the central government
subsidizes the health insurance payment of the poor, children under six and participants
having revolutionary merits or having been in state service. The insured are reimbursed
with up to 80 percent of treatment costs in the hospital to which one’s household regis-
tration is tagged.
Both countries have also been implementing rural pension schemes. By 2007, less than
10 percent of the 100 million Chinese elders living in rural areas received some form of
pension or old-age allowance; in 2009, China started to implement a rural pension
scheme with a basic (non-contributory) and an own-account component (contributory),
aiming to achieve 100-percent coverage by 2020 (Shen and Williamson 2010). In contrast
to the previous experiments with own-account-only arrangements the central state makes
differing contributions to the basic component, depending on regional wealth (from 80
percent in the poorest to 10 percent in the wealthiest regions), and the rest is local gov-
ernments’ responsibility. The own-account component requires paying an equivalent of
up to eight percent of the national average income for at least 15 years until the
person is at least 55 (female) and 60 (male). Those who are already 65 receive the basic
pension (8 USD) without having made any payment, provided that all their family
members over 16 join the scheme.
Vietnam also started a voluntary pension scheme in 2008 as an own-account system
available to the self-employed, farmers and other rural residents. Under this scheme, par-
ticipants pay at least 16 percent of the minimum wage per year (currently between 80 and
130 USD) for 20 years until they are 60 (male) or 55 (female) to get a monthly pension and
survivor benefits. Similar to the basic pension component of the Chinese system, there is a
non-contributory old-age allowance (13 USD), to which every person from the age of 80
not receiving any social benefits is entitled. Initial research and media coverage suggest
that the scheme is not attractive enough for rural people4. By 2010, there were only
more than 60,000 participants (Phuong and Castel 2009; Mai 2010). In 2013, private insur-
ance companies such as American International Assurance or Manulife and banks started
to market voluntary pension and establish pension funds. Further research is needed to
understand how privatized pension works out in Vietnam; for now, it is likely that afford-
ability will remain a major hindrance for rural people.
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Non-contributory welfare: cash transfer, social assistance and charity
In both countries, a range of cash transfer and social assistance programs target the rural
populations. In rural China, three main programs have been in place since the 1950s, the
rural wubao, tekun and dibao programs. The wubao program aimed to maintain the basic
living standard of the elderly, the disabled and children with no supporting family
members, no ability to work and no source of income (Three Nos). Also referred to as
the Five Guarantee program, it guaranteed food, clothing, housing, medical care and
burial expenses for the recipients, who live in either their own house or care homes.
The tekun program originally provided cash and kind assistance to destitute households
in poor rural regions, and later was replaced by the dibao (The Minimum Living Standard
Assurance) program. Dibao is aimed at providing a safety net for poor households whose
income lies below the local minimum living standards. First piloted in Shanghai in 1993, it
was expanded to all cities in 1999 and was adopted in rural areas from 2003. By 2012,
urban dibao recipients numbered 23 million, while there were over 50 million rural recipi-
ents (Gao and Zhai 2012). In 2007, each dibao monthly transfer amounted to 102 yuan for
urban areas, about one-tenth of the average pension, and 37 yuan for rural areas (Frazier
2010). Households under the scheme can also access subsidies and deductions in the costs
of using public services.
In Vietnam, through the Social Guarantee Fund for Regular Relief, monthly cash trans-
fers are made to poor elderly people without family members and income, orphaned chil-
dren, disabled people, and single parents without income,5 similar to the Chinese wubao
recipients. At a monthly sum of 270,000 VND (13 USD), the transfer covers more than one
million people in 2008 (1.3 percent of total population), the majority of whom are rural
(Mai 2010, 129). Another form of transfer distinct to Vietnam is the Social Guarantee
Fund for Veterans and War Invalids, through which veterans, war invalids and their
family members are entitled to monthly transfers of 700−1900.000 VND (35–95 USD). If
officially defined as poor or near-poor households, rural people can access a range of
benefits in kind, credit and services, such as housing loan, free health insurance, schooling
costs support or micro-credits for productive investment. Rural poor households are those
with a monthly per-capita income lower than 20 USD (400.000 VND), and near-poor house-
holds’ per-capital income ranges 401–500.000 VND (urban households have higher ceil-
ings).6 There is, however, often an implicit cap on the proportion of local households
that can be classified as poor, resulting in local negotiation and maneuvering around its
definition (Nguyen 2015a; Chaudhry 2016).
Apart from non-contributory cash transfers, a range of benefits and services are offered
by old and new community-based organizations in rural Vietnam and China. In both
countries, there is a system of mass organizations sponsored by the party-state for pur-
poses of political mobilization that has existed since the advent of state socialism.
These include organizations like the Women’s Federation/Union or the Youth Union,
which target specific groups through awareness raising, conflict resolution and mass edu-
cation on issues such as family planning, public health, and parenting. Their existence
remains instrumental for state purposes, yet these organizations have been also seeking
to reinvent themselves, for instance as partners of development activities, employment
service or philanthropy (Howell 1996; Zhang 1999; Li 2010; Waibel and Glück 2013). In
rural Vietnam, in particular, these organizations are embedded in social life and can
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provide important forms of communal care, such as summer activities for school children
or annual festivities (Nguyen 2015a).
The other kinds of social/popular organizations that have been mushrooming in both
countries are NGOs and community associations. There are now hundreds of thousands of
such organizations in China and thousands in Vietnam, offering care and assistance to
migrant workers, poor elderly, orphans, and the disabled or providing relief to victims
of natural disasters (Ma 2006; Li 2010; Wells-Dang 2012; Bui 2013). As Li (2010) suggests,
the effectiveness and responsiveness of popular organizations during such catastrophic
events as the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake have led the Chinese government to recognize
them, albeit within political limits. Although both governments have realized the need to
incorporate these organizations in welfare creation and distribution, there remains strong
suspicion that their social initiatives might turn into political movements that could jeopar-
dize the party-state’s power (Li 2010; Bui 2013). As a result, they continue to be tightly con-
trolled and can only be legally registered under the supervision of an existing state agency.
Meanwhile, these organizations are increasingly sponsored or co-financed by the govern-
ment f (Ma 2006; Bui 2013). Many are actually run by government officials or people with
state connections.
As well, there exist a multitude of spontaneous, religious and corporate philanthropic
activities reaching out to particular incidents of distress, victimhood or vulnerability
(Sidel 1997; Kupfer 2009; Li 2010; Dang et al. 2011; Hildebrandt 2013). In China, the corpor-
ate sector contributed 68 percent of total philanthropic giving in 2012 (Li, Song, and Wu
2014). In Vietnam, although the scale of philanthropic activities is smaller (Dang et al.
2011), major companies such as Vinamilk operate through state institutions to provide
millions of dollars’ worth of milk and scholarships to rural children. An example in China
is the journalist Deng Fei, who initiated the well-known initiative Free Lunch for Children
for rural schools. Local religious institutions and movements have also become active in
organizing relief to vulnerable groups (Dang et al. 2011; Nguyen 2015a; Kupfer 2009).
Whilst ‘doing charity’ is an important cultural value in both countries (Wong 1998;
Nguyen-Marshall 2008), it has assumed greater urgency as a moral obligation that individ-
uals, organizations and corporations alike must subscribe to in order to demonstrate their
social awareness and responsibility (Sidel 1997; Dang et al. 2011; Li, Song, and Wu 2014).
Regional and local politic of needs
While they have become more pluralistic, welfare arrangements in both countries gener-
ally divert resources to the higher-income sections of the populations and far more to
urban than rural areas (Evans et al. 2006; Evans and Harkness 2008; Besharov and
Baehler 2013; Gao, Evans, and Garfinkel 2013; London 2013). There remains a large
divide between rural and urban areas (Evans et al. 2006; Frazier 2010). The welfare
needs of the rural populations have often taken the back seat in these countries, where
the party-state’s modernizing goals place greater emphasis on the urban productive
work force (Wong 1998; Fesselmeyer and Le 2010; Cho 2013). As Frazier (2010) argues,
the current Chinese pension system initially evolved out of the politics of retrenchment
in urban factories, through which millions of workers were dispossessed of their employ-
ment, and with it the promised life-long social security. He shows that the angry
retrenched urban workers formed a looming political danger, and their effective
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mobilization through work units pressured the Chinese state to respond by reinstituting
pension and some forms of social support (see also Cho 2013; Yang 2013). Similarly,
health insurance and dibao started first in the cities in response to the discontent of the
dispossessed urban workforce, which pose a more immediate threat to the party-state
(Solinger 2008; Carrillo and Duckett 2011). Yet over time, dispossessed rural people,
who lose land and livelihoods to urbanization and development, have also become poten-
tially dangerous to the party-state and are able to advance their claims on similar entitle-
ments, often based on the very state rhetoric of social harmony (O’Brien and Li 2006; Wells-
Dang 2010). The migrant factory workers, now in their second and third generations,
possess a more politicized vocabulary of rights and entitlements and do not shy away
from putting forward their welfare demands (Pun and Huilin 2010; Kerkvliet 2011). As
Yan (2009) shows, a number of migrant workers in Beijing publicly demanded that their
children should have the right to go to high school and take part in the national university
entrance exam in Beijing rather than in their rural home town where they were registered.
The politics of needs plays out slightly differently in Vietnam, where the state has fewer
welfare liabilities for restructured state enterprises because of a smaller urban socialist work
force. Yet the legacies of war, which required a broad base of support and human contri-
butions by rural people means that the Vietnamese state cannot afford to overtly downplay
their welfare needs. This partly explains the broader base of the Vietnamese welfare state,
although cash transfers are more significant in China (London 2013; Gao, Evans, and Garfinkel
2013). In China, the rural–urban welfare difference has also been complicated by the differen-
tials between regions of varying economic development levels. Richer cities such as Guangz-
hou, Beijing, Chongqing and Shenzhen have been recently experimenting with harmonizing
rural and urban citizenship and thus equalizing access to social entitlements (Shi 2012). In
these experiments, rural and urban citizens have equal access to local social welfare entitle-
ments, to the exclusion of migrants from other regions. If the experiments are institutionalized,
the present rural–urban differentiation will be transformed into an inside-outsider division
between the most developed parts of China and its hinterland (Shi 2012).
Despite greater coverage, welfare programs have done little to address the inequalities
rooted in the growing privatization of social services and their hierarchical access. Vietna-
mese rural pensioners currently accounts for 3.5 percent of the total number (Mai 2010).
This proportion will be even smaller through the provision of private pension by large cor-
porations, which is likely to be accessible only to the better-off. Whereas in urban China,
certain groups can access pension and health insurance from their employers, peasants
can only do so if their local government is ready to pay their contributions (Frazier
2010). In both countries, although health care options are now diversified, prices have
risen and users’ fees in public hospitals have caused out-of-pocket payment to become
the most important form of health financing (Huong et al. 2007). These affect the
access of the rural poor, whether they have health insurance or not. As a rural informant
in Sichuan told Lora-Wainwright (2011, 104), ‘If you can walk and eat, you don’t go to hos-
pital’ – one only does if no other options exist, a situation that the authors also observed in
other rural areas of both countries. The fact that access to social services is tagged to the
household registration also renders health insurance largely irrelevant for migrants who
directly seek urban health care without referral from rural facilities.
The differential resources of localities with varying levels of development exacerbate the
unequal distribution of welfare, especially in China. Unlike in Vietnam, where social
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insurance schemes are coordinated by the central state, the local state in China is primarily
responsible for such programs. In China, responsibility has been shifted down the system
from the central level and up from the work unit and agricultural cooperative to converge
in the local government (Cook 2011, 216). The local state’s differing capacity to negotiate
between generating revenues and service provision leads to regional variations and inequal-
ities. Local officials, who tend to behave like entrepreneurs, sometimes siphon off resources
from welfare to profitable investments (Frazier 2010; Li and Greve 2011). As an example, the
Shanghai government made loans worth 4.2 billion USD out of its pension funds to local
developers for more than a decade until this was exposed in 2006 (Frazier 2010). Partly
because of such fragmentation, state social services and entitlements in rural and urban
areas alike continue to play relatively insignificant roles for people in urgent need of care,
especially the elderly or the disabled (Carrillo and Duckett 2011).
Means-tested benefits such as the Chinese dibao and the poor household support in
Vietnam are also kept to the minimum (Solinger 2011). These schemes are implemented
through community-based processes of assessment and selection with potentials for
manipulation by local leaders, reinforcement of local power hierarchies and social ostraciza-
tion (Solinger 2008; Nguyen 2015a; Chaudhry 2016). The categories of ‘poor household’ in
Vietnam and ‘dibao households’ in China have become the emblems of dependency and
problematic social groups who fail to meet the human capital requirements of the new
economy. While they must be supported for the sake of social stability,7 they should be con-
tinuously monitored and re-evaluated in order to prevent their abuse of and chronic depen-
dence on state benevolence (Hammond 2011; Solinger and Hu 2012; Chaudhry 2016). As
Minh Nguyen finds in her research, notions of deservingness and moral propriety also
define local processes of negotiation around the poor households, thus moralizing the
implementation of the program and rendering its beneficiaries morally problematic.
The ‘welfare portfolio’ of rural people in both countries, meanwhile, is becoming more
and more diversified while displaying a prevalent concern with future risks and uncertain-
ties. Zhang (2017) shows that in addition to their children’s support, elderly informants in a
village of Hubei province rely on new government schemes such as the Rural Old Age
Insurance Scheme or the Rural Cooperative Medical System and market services such as
private elderly care homes for the sake of independence in old age. They also make use
of private childcare services to support their migrant children and their own productive
activities. The rural households in northern Vietnam that Nguyen studies (2015a) do the
same, also seeking care services from religious and local associations. As Zhang (2017)
and Nguyen (2015a) show, market actors capitalize on such values as filial piety, mutual
obligation and self-reliance while marketing the risks and uncertainties of the new
economy to promote products and services such as life insurance or care homes in
rural areas. In China, a whole ‘filial piety industry’ marketing services has emerged
(Santos and Harrell 2017, 21), including the offer of life insurance packages that children
could buy for their parents. Similar ideas are catching on in Vietnam, while life insurance
companies are starting to expand to rural areas in both countries.
Non-state welfare actors similarly compete for moral authority over their customers, fol-
lowers and clients in ways that resemble the state’s governing approach through a combi-
nation of moral discourses and social control. For instance, the ritual services offered by a
local Buddhist pagoda in Northern Vietnam are foregrounded by the idea that they are
essential to the spiritual and material well-being of the whole family (Nguyen 2015a). This
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creates a moral mandate for the pagoda as provider of these services, allowing it to put
claim on local people’s loyalty and thus their monetary obligations. In Chen’s study of a
South China village (2013), the hometown of many overseas Chinese, village elders
employ the official and popular rhetoric of patriotism, hometown loyalty and respect for
the ancestors to attract funding for village and lineage projects. By providing public
goods in this way, these elderly villagers become recognized community leaders with auth-
ority parallel to that of village cadres. These local actors participate in welfare provision in
ways that gain credentials for them vis-à-vis local people and the state, for whose
‘welfare socialization’ agenda their participation is instrumental. For corporations, partici-
pation in welfare provision often constitutes a strategy for consolidating their political con-
nections and power position in both the market and society (Li, Song, and Wu 2014).
Conclusion
Beneath ambitious visions for a modern welfare state in China and Vietnam are intense
struggles over the interpretation of needs, family obligations and redistribution of
resources underlined by uneven regional economic development and unequal structures
of opportunities. Despite coverage expansion, post-reform welfare in China and Vietnam is
both divisive and exclusive. Access is determined by a social hierarchy between civil ser-
vants and non-civil servants, between urban citizens and migrants, between insiders and
outsiders, between groups of high and low population quality. Some groups, therefore, are
better positioned to secure welfare than the others. With varied agendas, state, market and
third-sector welfare institutions operate based on both moral discourses and market prin-
ciples. Their mutual embeddedness suggests that the double movement of economic lib-
eralization and social protection that Polanyi talks about (1985) are mutually constitutive
rather than mutually exclusive.
What is particular about the rise of social protection in Vietnam and China under market
socialism is the strong role of the party-state, which not only relentlessly fosters the culti-
vation of the self-responsible moral subject but also exercises a grip on the moral obli-
gations of non-state institutions. Welfare is vital to the party-state, for it gives ‘a new
legitimacy and permanence to the political arrangements that supervised payments
and ensured their continuity. Thus social cohesion was enhanced, the dangers of fragmen-
tation reduced, and the threat of a radical challenge to the political order diminished’
(Rose 1999, 82). Meanwhile, means-tested social protection for the poor, the incapacitated
and the vulnerable strengthens the image of the party-state as the caring guardian of
people’s well-being. Reworked into the moral, technocratic interventions divert attention
from the dispossession and devaluation that underline post-reform social problems.
Indeed, it represents ‘a strategic inoculation against a more broadly and socially contested
double movement, the kind of political double movement arguably most feared by the
agents of a wider liberal project’ (Porter and Craig 2004, 257), and those of the party-state.
Notes
1. While universal education is compulsory up to Grade 9 and is state funded, multiple forms of
fees proliferate in public schools, creating significant financial burdens for families with school
children.
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2. The old 24 Filial Exemplars include references to parables of exemplary acts of filial piety,
stories about people’s self-negation and extreme sacrifices for the sake of their parents, for
example, somebody who buried his own son to save his mother from hunger.
3. http://primeminister.chinhphu.vn/Home/PM-eyes-90-health-insurance-coverage-by-2020/
20166/3244.vgp, official website of the Vietnamese government, accessed on 28 October
2016.
4. http://baoquangngai.vn/channel/2027/201310/bao-hiem-xa-hoi-tu-nguyen-kho-den-tay-
nong-dan-2267872/ (Voluntary insurance is difficult to access for farmers).
5. http://vanban.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/hethongvanban?class_id=1&mo-
de=detail&document_id=22662 – Nghị định về chính sách trợ giúp các đối tượng bảo trợ xã
hội (Decree on the policy for supporting social protection targets).
6. http://vanban.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/chinhphu/hethongvanban%3Fclass_id%3D1%
26_page%3D37%26mode%3Ddetail%26document_id%3D98923. Quyết định về việc ban
hành chuẩn hộ nghèo, hộ cận nghèo áp dụng cho giai đoạn 2011–15 (Decision on the stan-
dards for poor and near-poor household between 2011 and 2015).
7. Solinger and Hu (2012) found that richer cities are more generous in their dibao provisions but
try to keep poor people off the street, whereas poorer cities offer less of such provisions but
are less strict in regulating local people’s livelihoods activities on the street.
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